NEW DELHI: The killing of 10 security personnel, including nine CRPF men, in Latehar encounter has stirred a debate about mobilization of a large contingent in anti-Maoist operations.
In the Latehar operation, about 500 security force personnel — three CRPF companies and two companies of the Jharkhand Jaguar — were deployed. For about a month they chased the Maoists around Jharkhand's Karmatiya forest area. They cordoned off zones (gherabandi) following inputs about the presence of the Maoists in the area.
Veterans of anti-Maoist operations and a section of the CRPF are questioning the efficacy of such large scale mobilization.
Maoists are a guerrilla force thriving on surprise attacks on their targets. Experts across the world have stressed on the need of economy of force in anti-guerrilla operations. A small, highly trained and disciplined, lightly equipped and aggressive counter-insurgent unit has been found to be effective in such operations. It allows the unit mobility and enables them to launch a surprise attack on guerrillas.
"We've got best results in anti-Maoist operations when we, too, fought like guerrillas in small units backed by specific intelligence inputs," said a senior officer handling anti-Maoist operations. The strategy was key to debilitating the Maoists in Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal.
Security forces are often vulnerable to ambushes laid by Maoists. Small groups of security forces can equally make the Maoists vulnerable to ambushes disrupting their movement. The Red ultras draw strength from their mobility — assemble or disperse as required. Besides cadres, there is a web of movement of supplies, couriers and local contacts to and from Maoists.
Based on quality intelligence inputs from local police, security forces in AP, Bengal and Jharkhand, too, had succeeded in selecting specific targets and disrupting Maoist supply chains, and consequently restricting their movement. Small units of security forces armed with modern weapon had taken on Maoists in their bastion, inflicted casualties and managed to fade away, said an officer.
But, anti-Maoist operations currently are hamstrung by poor real-time intelligence. To offset this weakness, strategists plan mobilization of large contingent of forces over a long time. That helps Maoists track the movement of the force and gives them an advantage as in the Latehar encounter.
Moreover, during the operation, troops are replenished. Newly-inducted troops are unfamiliar with the terrain and with fellow fighters, both important in such operations. "That also leads to communication gap and the result is disastrous," said an officer.
In a similar large scale gherabandi operation last July, two CRPF men were killed and five, including an officer, were injured in an encounter near a government school in Jharkhand's Khunti district, about 100 km from Ranchi. Though Maoists were accused of the killings, home ministry sources admitted they were gunned down by another CRPF contingent who mistook them for rebels in fatigues.
Such incidents sag the morale of the security forces fighting an invisible enemy in hostile environment.
Latehar encounter raises questions of efficacy of operations strategy
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Latehar encounter raises questions of efficacy of operations strategy
